Recent research utilizing Secure Virtual Architecture (SVA) has demonstrated that compiler-based virtual machines can protect applications from side-channel attacks launched by compromised operating system kernels. However, SVA provides no instructions for using hardware virtualization features such as Intel's Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX) and AMD's Secure Virtual Machine (SVM). Consequently, operating systems running on top of SVA cannot run guest operating systems using features such as Linux's Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) and FreeBSD's bhyve.

This paper presents a set of new SVA instructions that allow an operating system kernel to configure and use the Intel VMX hardware features. Additionally, we use these new instructions to create \emph{Shade}. Shade extends Apparition (an SVA-based system) to ensure that a compromised host operating system cannot use the new VMX virtual instructions to attack host applications (either directly or via page-fault and last-level-cache side-channel attacks).