Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) services have been widely provided by mainstream security industries so as to defend against complex and advanced attacks. To create a trustworthy transaction environment, the consortium blockchain based CTI service platform has been investigated in academics and industries, where CTI service requesters and providers exchange their information and payments in a decentralized manner. However, the incentives of the blockchain platform, requesters, and providers have not attracted sufficient attention, which is crucial for the success of sustainability of the CTI service ecosystem. To tackle the challenges mentioned above, we have conducted a comprehensive analysis of the organizations within the consortium blockchain based CTI sharing system, which consists of two distinct layers including the consortium blockchain layer and the user layer. The platform operates within the federated blockchain layer, whereas both requesters and service providers are positioned within the user layer. Specifically, the incentive issue for the organizations within the system is formalized as a tripartite dynamic game-theoretic model. Namely, we explore the interactive behaviors of the requester, platform, and service provider, providing an analysis of the strategic interactions and detailing an equilibrium solution for the model to motivate organizations to actively participate in CTI sharing within the CTI market, offering high-quality CTI to jointly strengthen defenses against cyber attacks. Furthermore, we perform a comprehensive performance analysis of the proposed model and empirically demonstrate its capacity to enhance active participation in CTI sharing, using a series of numerical experiments.