Vision: Identifying Affected Library Versions for Open Source Software Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability reports play a crucial role in mitigating open-source software risks. Typically, the vulnerability report contains affected versions of a software. However, despite the validation by security expert who discovers and vendors who review, the affected versions are not always accurate. Especially, the complexity of maintaining its accuracy increases significantly when dealing with multiple versions and their differences. Several advances have been made to identify affected versions. However, they still face limitations. First, some existing approaches identify affected versions based on repository-hosting platforms (i.e., GitHub), but these versions are not always consistent with those in package registries (i.e., Maven). Second, existing approaches fail to distinguish the importance of different vulnerable methods and patched statements in face of vulnerabilities with multiple methods and change hunks.
To address these problems, this paper proposes a novel approach, Vision, to accurately identify affected library versions (ALVs) for vulnerabilities. Vision uses library versions from the package registry as inputs. To distinguish the importance of vulnerable methods and patched statements, Vision performs critical method selection and critical statement selection to prioritize important changes and their context. Furthermore, the vulnerability signature is represented by weighted inter-procedural program dependency graphs that incorporate critical methods and statements. Vision determines ALVs based on the similarities between these weighted graphs. Our evaluation demonstrates that Vision outperforms state-of-the-art approaches, achieving a precision of 0.91 and a recall of 0.94. Additionally, our evaluation shows the practical usefulness of Vision in correcting affected versions in existing vulnerability databases.
Tue 29 OctDisplayed time zone: Pacific Time (US & Canada) change
10:30 - 12:00 | Vulnerability and security1Research Papers / Tool Demonstrations at Gardenia Chair(s): Curtis Atkisson UW | ||
10:30 15mTalk | REACT: IR-Level Patch Presence Test for Binary Research Papers Qi Zhan Zhejiang University, Xing Hu Zhejiang University, Xin Xia Huawei, Shanping Li Zhejiang University | ||
10:45 15mTalk | Snopy: Bridging Sample Denoising with Causal Graph Learning for Effective Vulnerability Detection Research Papers Sicong Cao Yangzhou University, Xiaobing Sun Yangzhou University, Xiaoxue Wu Yangzhou University, David Lo Singapore Management University, Lili Bo Yangzhou University, Bin Li Yangzhou University, Xiaolei Liu China Academy of Engineering Physics, Xingwei Lin Zhejiang University, Wei Liu Nanjing University Media Attached | ||
11:00 15mTalk | Unveiling the Characteristics and Impact of Security Patch Evolution Research Papers Zifan Xie Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Ming Wen Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Zichao Wei Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hai Jin Huazhong University of Science and Technology Media Attached | ||
11:15 15mTalk | Compositional Security Analysis of Dynamic Component-based Systems Research Papers | ||
11:30 15mTalk | Vision: Identifying Affected Library Versions for Open Source Software Vulnerabilities Research Papers Susheng Wu Fudan University, Ruisi Wang Fudan University, Kaifeng Huang Tongji University, Yiheng Cao Fudan University, Wenyan Song Fudan University, Zhuotong Zhou Fudan University, China, Yiheng Huang Fudan University, Bihuan Chen Fudan University, Xin Peng Fudan University Media Attached | ||
11:45 10mTalk | VulZoo: A Comprehensive Vulnerability Intelligence Dataset Tool Demonstrations Bonan Ruan National University of Singapore, Jiahao Liu National University of Singapore, Weibo Zhao National University of Singapore, Zhenkai Liang National University of Singapore |