Hypervisor is the core technology of virtualization for emulating independent hardware resources for each virtual machine. Virtual devices serve as the main interface of the hypervisor, making the security of virtual devices crucial, as any vulnerabilities can impact the entire virtualization environment and pose a threat to the host machine’s security. Direct Memory Access (DMA) is the interface of virtual devices, enabling communication with the host machine. Recently, many efforts have focused on fuzzing against DMA to discover the hypervisor’s vulnerabilities. However, the lack of sensitivity to the DMA state causes these efforts to be hindered in efficiency during fuzzing. Specifically, there are two main issues: the uncertain interaction moment and the unclear interaction depth.

In this paper, we introduce InSVDF, a DMA interface state-aware fuzzing engine. InSVDF first models the intra-interface state of the DMA interface and incorporates an asynchrony-aware state snapshot mechanism along with a depth-aware seed preservation mechanism. To validate our approach, we compare InSVDF with a state-of-the-art fuzzer. The results demonstrate that InSVDF significantly enhances vulnerability discovery speed, with improvements of up to 24.2x in the best case. Furthermore, InSVDF has identified 2 new vulnerabilities, one of which has been assigned a CVE ID.